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BOOK REVIEW
Disaster By Decree. LINo A. GRAGLIA. Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University Press. 1976. Pp. 351. $11.50.
Disaster by Decree, by Professor Lino A. Graglia of the Univer-
sity of Texas School of Law, is subtitled "The Supreme Court
Decisions on Race and the Schools," and as the blurb on the book
jacket states, it is a "sharply critical view of the court rulings that
led to forced busing." My own views on the question of "forced
busing," or as I prefer to call it, "integration by busing," are
diametrically opposite to those of Professor Graglia; these views
have been shaped by my experiences both as a teacher of a course
in Civil Rights and as a lawyer who has represented the plaintiffs in
desegregation litigation.' I favor busing because I favor integra-
tion, and busing is the only means by which schools can be racially
integrated in most school districts today.2 At the same time, I be-
lieve that it is possible to shift one's perspective from advocacy to
scholarship, and to subject Professor Graglia's book to critical and
scholarly analysis on at least a "reasonably objective" basis.
While I disagree with some of Professor Graglia's conclusions,
I do think that he has effectively pointed up both the doctrinal and
functional difficulties inherent in the Supreme Court's present ap-
proach to racial segregation in public schools. Specifically, I agree
with his conclusions that (1) the Supreme Court has purportedly
required racial integration for the purpose of remedying past dis-
crimination, but has not directly related the extent of required
racial integration to the extent of state-imposed segregation; and
(2) it has not squarely faced the question of whether the Constitu-
tion requires racial integration because racial segregation, regard-
less of "cause," violates the rights of black children who are re-
quired to attend racially segregated schools. This Book Review will
1 Louisville-Jefferson County, Kentucky: Cunningham v. Grayson, 541 F.2d 538 (6th
Cir. 1976); Newburg Area Council v. Gordon, 521 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1975); Newburg
Area Council v. Board of Educ., 489 F.2d 925 (6th Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 418
U.S. 918, reinstated, 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975). Fayette
County, Kentucky: Jefferson v. Board of Educ., 344 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Ky. 1972). Charles-
ton, Missouri: Davis v. Board of Educ. 216 F. Supp. 295 (E.D. Mo. 1963). 1 will also be
acting as co-counsel in the Atlanta, Georgia metropolitan desegregation case, Armour v.
Nix, No. 16708 (N.D. Ga., filed June 7, 1972).
2 In many urban areas, effective integration will require an inter-district remedy,
which despite the Supreme Court's decision in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974),
may be imposed in appropriate cases. See generally Sedler, Metropolitan Desegregation in the
Wake of Milliken-On Losing Big Battles and Winnings Small Wars: The View Largely from
Within, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 535.
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focus on Professor Graglia's conclusions about what the Court has
been doing and about the validity of the justifications that it has
given for its actions.
Although Professor Graglia strongly criticizes the Court for
assuming what he believes to be an improper "policy-making" role,
the thrust of the book is not so much an attack on judicial
"policy-making," as it is on the Court's decisions themselves, and on
its "institutional behavior" in the area of "race and the schools."
Professor Graglia's thesis is that the Court, while purportedly only
"remedying" the school segregation found racially discriminatory
and thus unconstitutional in Brown 1,3 has now required "the use of
racial discrimination. '4 He relates this first to the Court's decision
in Brown 11,5 where it held that school boards had to desegregate by
submitting a "plan," but that there could be delay in full im-
plementation of the plan. He contends that the Court should have
ordered the immediate implementation of racially neutral school
assignments across the board, particularly since at the time it was
assumed that geographic attendance zoning, i.e., "neighborhood
school" assignment, was fully constitutional. In his view, such a
holding would have remedied the constitutional violation that the
Brown I Court found, and would have avoided any question about
the "adequacy" of desegregation plans then or in the future. 6 But
having taken the approach that it did, and being impatient with the
failure of the school boards to achieve "adequate" desegregation,
the Court in succeeding years made it clear, he asserts, that the
"school racial separation being 'remedied' could not be attributed
to unconstitutional school segregation and that, in fact, it was sim-
ply school racial separation or imbalance itself, however caused,
that had become unconstitutional."' He is most critical, of course,
of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,8 which autho-
rized extensive busing in some instances (and the resulting aboli-
tion of "neighborhood schools"), and is equally critical of the
Court's approach to de jure segregation outside the South, as re-
flected in its decision in Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver.9 Al-
though he approves of the decision in Milliken v. Bradley,"° which
limited the power of the federal courts to impose inter-district rem-
' Brown v. Board of Educ. I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4 P. 15.
Brown v. Board of Educ. II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
6 Pp. 34-37.
7 P. 16.
8 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
9 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
1' 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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edies,"1 it is only because that decision did not "make a bad situa-
tion worse." He also argues that the same reasons that made inter-
district busing improper there should also have made busing
improper within the Detroit school district itself' 2
Although the book is written in a popular style and fully con-
veys the author's strong feelings that busing is a "disaster," it is not
a polemic, but rather a scholarly and critical analysis of what the
author believes to be the Court's objective in requiring racial
integration regardless of other "costs." There are, however, two
points on which I think the author can be faulted for "scholarly
inadequacy." First, there is his use of the term "racial discrimina-
tion," which he equates with racial classification. Graglia essentially
argues that taking race into account for purposes of school integra-
tion constitutes racial discrimination in the same manner as taking
it into account for purposes of school segregation. 13 He attacks the
Court for "casually" saying in Swann that school boards can volun-
tarily integrate, even to the point of requiring that "each school
should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflect-
ing the proportion for the district as a whole."' 4 Although correctly
noting that the question of voluntary integration was not presented
for decision in Swann, he goes on to say that when it is presented,
"it should either be one of great difficulty or easily decided in the
negative, on the ground that such a policy would grossly disadvan-
tage individuals because of their race.' 5 Professor Graglia's as-
sumption, however, that racial classification is the equivalent of
racial discrimination assumes the point in issue and completely
ignores a substantial body of case law holding to the contrary. The
Supreme Court has expressly held in other contexts that taking
race into account is not unconstitutional 6 -the Constitution is not
"colorblind"' 7
-and that the Constitution prohibits only those
racial clasifications that cannot be "shown to be necessary to the ac-
complishment of some permissible state objective, independent
of the racial discrimination which it was the object of the Four-
" The decision may not significantly limit the power of the federal courts to impose
inter-district remedies. See generally Sedler, supra note 2. Professor Graglia notes that the
Court did not preclude inter-district busing after Milliken, and that "many lower courts
will, in any event, not quickly be convinced that the time for busing is over." P. 257.
12 Pp. 237-38.
"See, e.g., pp. 15, 67, 72, 82, 85-87, 96, 97, 256, 260.
14 402 U.S. at 16.
15 P. 118.
16 See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); Tancil v. Woolls, 379
U.S. 19 (1964).
"See Griswold, Some Observations on the DeFunis Case, 75 COLUM. L. Rav. 512, 518-19
(1975) (discussion of "color-blind syllogism").
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teenth Amendment to eliminate."' 8 Presumably, assigning students
to schools on a racial basis in order to provide them with an inte-
grated educational experience is a permissible state objective, and
thus would not necessarily be unconstitutional. It would be uncon-
stitutional only if somehow it were found to violate the rights of the
students who, in the absence of such racial assignment, would be at-
tending a different school. Although Professor Graglia contends
that students are severely disadvantaged by being bused from their
"neighborhood schools,"' 9 all of the courts passing on the question
of "voluntary integration" have held that this supposed "disadvan-
tage" does not rise to constitutional dimensions, and have em-
phasized that there is no constitutional right to attend a particular
school or to avoid being "bused" in order to attend school with
children of another race." They have thus held that classification
by race for purposes of school integration does not amount to
racial discrimination and is fully constitutional. I think that it was
incumbent upon Professor Graglia to discuss this matter fully, since
he uses the term "racial discrimination" to characterize racial clas-
sification for integration purposes as unconstitutional per se.
Second, Professor Graglia tends to be somewhat elusive in his
use of the term "racial balance," which has a well-settled legal
definition. By his evasive use of this term, Professor Graglia implies
that there is a Court-imposed requirement, which had never existed
or been imposed by the lower courts. In Swann, the Court defined
"racial balance" as a requirement that the black-white ratio be the
same in every school as it is in the system as a whole.2' The Court
explicitly stated that "racial balance" was not the test to determine
the adequacy of a desegregation plan. 22 Rather the test, as stated in
Swann's companion case, Davis v. Board of School Commissioners,23 is
the "greatest possible degree of actual desegregation, taking into
account the practicalities of the situation."2 4
18 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
19 P. 194.2 0 See, e.g., Tometz v. Board of Educ., 39 Ill. 2d 593, 237 N.E.2d 498 (1968); School
Comm. of Boston v. Board of Educ., 362 Mass. 693, 227 N.E.2d 729 (1967), appeal
dismissed, 389 U.S. 572 (1968); Booker v. Board of Educ., 45 N.J. 161, 212 A.2d 1 (1965);
Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Chester Sch. Dist., 427 Pa. 157, 233 A.2d 290
(1967). See also Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 935
(1971).
21 402 U.S. at 23-24.
22 "The constitutional command to desegregate schools does not mean that every
school in every community must always reflect the racial composition of the school system
as a whole." Id. at 24.
23 402 U.S. 33 (1971).
24 Id. at 37.
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The "greatest possible degree of actual desegregation," in
turn, relates to the elimination of racially identifiable schools,
which, as the Court emphasized in Swann, is the primary objective
of any desegregation plan.25 In practice, this is accomplished by
using minimum-maximum ratios: considering the racial composi-
tion of the school district as a whole, in which blacks generally are
in the minority,2 6 no school should have so few blacks as to appear
to be a racially identifiable white school or so many blacks as to
appear to be a racially identifiable black school. Ordinarily, the
minimum-maximum ratios allow considerable flexibility-e.g., in a
district where blacks make up 20% of the population, a minimum
of 10% black and a maximum of 40% black 27-and where practical
considerations so require, the courts will uphold plans that leave
some schools as racially identifiable black schools.28 Professor Grag-
lia completely ignores this flexibility, stating that Swann established
a "requirement of almost perfectly racially balanced schools regard-
less of cost."'29 He also equates "racial balance" with the elimination
of racially identifiable schools3 -- concepts which, as pointed out
above, are simply not analogous. Professor Graglia should have
defined exactly what he meant by "racial balance," and should have
indicated whether he was using the term in the sense that the
Court used it in Swann, or simply to mean the elimination of ra-
cially identifiable schools. 31 He certainly should not have given the
impression that the Court was requiring balance as it has defined
that term, since it clearly has not done so.
25 402 U.S. at 26.
26 However, in metropolitan areas containing urban school districts surrounded by
suburban districts, blacks will often be in the majority in the urban district, making deseg-
regation of the urban district alone of doubtful efficacy because of the possibility of "white
flight" to the adjoining suburban district. See the discussion in Sedler, supra note 2, at
538-43.
27 The desegregation plan for the merged Louisville-Jefferson County (Kentucky) Dis-
trict, which was approximately 20% black, used a minimum-maximum ratio of 12% to 40%
black for the elementary schools, and 12.5% to 35% for the secondary schools. Cunning-
ham v. Grayson, 541 F.2d 538, 540 (6th Cir. 1976). In Denver, Colorado, the minimum-
maximum ratio was computed with reference to whites, since blacks and Hispanic students
were treated as a unit for desegregation purposes. The elementary school range was 40%
to 70% white, with a "somewhat higher" range for the secondary schools. Keyes v. School
Dist. No. 1, Denver, 521 F.2d 465, 475-76 (10th Cir. 1975).
21See, e.g., Medley v. School Bd., 482 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1172 (1974); Goss v. Board of Educ., 482 F.2d 1044 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1171 (1974).
29 p. 116.
30 P. 145.
31 It has been my experience in practice that attorneys who represent school boards
also tend to equate the elimination of racially identifiable schools with "racial balance." The
courts have had no difficulty in drawing the distinction.
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These "inadequacies," however, do not undercut the basic
thrust of Professor Graglia's analysis and criticism. He maintains
that what the Constitution prohibits is racial discrimination in pub-
lic education-that is, the establishment of separate schools for
blacks and whites-and that the remedies for such prohibited dis-
crimination must be aimed at eliminating officially established
separate schools. It is irrelevant, in Professor Graglia's view, that a
substantial number of racially identifiable schools may remain after
established separate schools are eliminated. He accuses the Court
of imposing, in the guise of remedying the discrimination caused
by the establishment of racially segregated schools, a requirement
of racially integrated schools, even though the racially segregated
character of the existing schools cannot be traced to the state-
imposed discrimination. 32 In Brown, he argues, the Court should
have struck down state-imposed segregation on the ground that
"laws requiring school assignment on the basis of race to keep the
races separate are unconstitutional, 33 without regard to any harm
such segregation may have had on the "educational achievement"
of black children. 34 This explanation of Brown, with which I agree,
is buttressed by the Court's decision in the companion case of
Bolling v. Sharpe,35 invalidating on due process grounds school seg-
regation in the District of Columbia. In Boiling, racial segregation
simply did not advance any legitimate state interest, so that the
resulting restraint on the liberty of black and white children to
attend the same schools was unconstitutional.3 6
But regardless of the doctrinal basis of Brown, the question is
still how to remedy the condition of de jure segregation that ex-
isted in the states where segregation was required by law. Professor
Graglia's contention, as pointed out above, is that de jure segrega-
tion is adequately remedied by the adoption of racially neutral
assignment plans, even if this results in little actual integration and
32 Pp. 73-74.
33 p. 18.
3 Pp. 26-29.
35 347 U.S, 497 (1954).
36 Professor Graglia points out that blacks and whites are "disadvantaged" by state-
imposed school segregation, and that "[n]o resort to psychology is necessary to show this."
P. 30. The unconstitutionality of state-imposed segregation, solely on the ground that it
advances no legitimate state interest, is further demonstrated, as Professor Graglia notes,
by the Supreme Court's per curiam decisions based on Brown-invalidating state-imposed
segregation in public facilities, transportation, and the like. P. 29. I much prefer the "lack
of legitimate interest" rationale of Boiling to the "tangible harm" rationale of Brown. The
"lack of legitimate interest" rationale is buttressed by the Court's decision in Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), invalidating Virginia's anti-miscegenation law because it could
only advance the "illegitimate" state policy of "white supremacy."
[Vol. 62:645
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the maintenance of a large number of racially identifiable schools.
He further contends that an affirmative requirement of racial in-
tegration is in itself racially discriminatory and not related to rem-
edying the constitutional violation found to exist.3 7 Graglia says
that in Green v. County School Board of New Kent County38 the Court
began to change the "constitutional mandate from a prohibition to
a requirement of racial discrimination in school assignment ' 39 and,
while purportedly remedying de jure segregation, imposed a re-
quirement of "racial mixing. '4" He does not necessarily disagree
with the holding in Green, which invalidated "freedom of choice"
plans that did not produce actual desegregation or eliminate the
racially identifiable character of the schools, because, as he points
out, these plans were only used in districts that were required to
desegregate, the teaching staffs of the schools were still segre-
gated, and there were many obstacles to truly "free choice."41
Rather, his criticism goes to the requirement that actual desegrega-
tion must be achieved regardless of the "neutral" nature of the
method of student assignment employed.
It was this requirement that reached fruition in Swann, where
the Court held that "neighborhood school" assignment was inade-
quate to eliminate de jure segregation if a substantial number of
one-race schools remained, and authorized the use of busing to
"break up" the segregated character of the school system. Al-
though Swann did not "establish a requirement of almost perfectly
racially balanced schools regardless of cost,"'42 it did require, to the
extent practicable, the elimination of racially identifiable schools.
Professor Graglia criticizes the Court in Swann for requiring a "ra-
cial mix" in the schools under the guise of remedying de jure
segregation. 43 This criticism completely ignores what I would call
the "remedy dilemma" that confronted the Court in Swann, be-
cause it assumes the point in issue, which was the relationship
between past state-imposed segregation and the present racially iden-
tifiable character of the schools. Professor Graglia states dogmat-
ically that the "racial imbalance" existing in the school system "was
not due to former segregation. '44 But the entire basis for the
Court's holding in Swann was that the present racially identifiable
P3 p. 86-87.
38 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
39 P. 67.
40 P. 73.
41 p. 76-80.
42 P. 116.
4 Pp. 122-26.
44 P. 115.
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character of the school system was due to state-imposed segrega-
tion, or at least that it was presumed to be so, since the school board
could not establish the contrary. Professor Graglia fails to con-
front this issue, and as a result, his criticism of Swann does not
deal with the "remedies value judgment" that the Court made
in that case.
In saying that the "racial imbalance" was not due to former
segregation, Professor Graglia apparently assumes that in an urban
school district, even in the absence of state-imposed segregation,
there will always be a substantial number of one-race schools be-
cause of patterns of residential racial segregation. Although this is
true, a school district located in a state where racial segregation was
once required by law also has its particular structure because of
state-imposed segregation. The structure of these school districts
was necessarily established in conformity to requirements of state-
imposed segregation; decisions as to school construction, site loca-
tion, school size, and the like had to be made with reference to
those requirements. That structure remains today, since the great
majority of existing schools in most urban school districts in the
South are pre-Brown schools. 45 Logically enough, black schools
were located in black neighborhoods, and white schools were lo-
cated in white neighborhoods. In addition, some white schools
were located in close proximity to black schools to serve whites re-
siding in adjacent or "mixed" residential areas. The present racial
identity of these schools is thus attributable to past state-imposed
segregation requirements. The school map would look very differ-
ent, today were it not for those requirements. No "rational" school
planner, for example, would locate schools so'close to each other,
as is frequently the case in a dual system, where one was formerly a
black school and the other was previously a white school. 46 Al-
though there is simply no way of knowing what the structure of the
school system would have been if not for state-imposed segre-
gation, it is clear that it would have been different from what it
is now.
'5 In Louisville, for example, 56 of the 65 schools in operation as of 1972 were
pre-Brown schools, and 35 of them had never changed their racial composition. Newburg
Area Council v. Board of Educ., 489 F.2d 925, 929-30 (6th Cir. 1973). In most urban
districts, enrollments have remained relatively stable or have declined. The growth has
been in the surburban districts, where middle-class whites with school age children are
moving. 1 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 18-19
(1967).
16 As residential patterns change, these former white schools can "contain" the expand-
ing black population. In Louisville, for example, most of the pre-Brown white schools lo-
cated in close proximity to the pre-Brown black schools became racially identifiable black
schools, while a few were integrated.
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The Court recognized this in Swann, when it observed that
"[a]ll things are not equal in a system that has been deliberately
constructed and maintained to enforce racial segregation. '47 At the
same time, it cannot be denied that even in the absence of state-
imposed segregation, there would have been a large number of
racially identifiable schools, particularly at the elementary level, as
a result of "neighborhood school" assignment and racially segre-
gated residential patterns. The dilemma facing the Court in Swann,
then, was clearly a "remedy dilemma." How was it to remedy de
jure segregation where the structure of the system was established
in accordance with the requirements of state-imposed segregation,
resulting in a very large number of racially identifiable schools, but
where, even in the absence of state-imposed segregation, there
would still have been a substantial number of racially identifiable
schools? Its options appear to have been as follows: (1) ignore the
influence of state-imposed segregation on the structure of the
school system and uphold "neighborhood school" assignment; (2)
try to "sort out" the schools that would not have been racially
identifiable in the absence of state-imposed segregation, and limit
relief to those schools; (3) treat the school system as being racially
segregated, and require its dismantling by a plan that would
achieve the "greatest possible degree of actual desegregation, tak-
ing into account the practicalities of the situation." The Court
made what I call a "remedy value judgment"-to opt for the third
alternative-and refused to exempt the comparatively few urban
district post-Brown schools from the integration requirement. The
Court's articulation of its value judgment may have been less than
ideal, but the value judgment was made, nonetheless.
Convinced that the Court was determined to require "racial
balance" as a substantive right under the guise of remedying de
jure segregation, Professor Graglia completely ignores the "remedy
dilemma" facing the Court in Swann. There are arguments that
could be advanced in criticism of the Court's value judgment, and a
belief in the social utility of racial integration may have "tipped the
scales" in favor of the integration alternative. But I do not think
that Swann can be properly analyzed without regard to the "rem-
edy dilemma." For this reason Professor Graglia's criticism of
Swann is not well-founded.
In Swann, then, the Court made a decision with respect to the
remedy necessary to eliminate de jure segregation. Given its remedy
decision, however, it also defined the nature of the substantive
47 402 U.S. at 28.
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right recognized in Brown I: a right to attend school in a school
system from which all vestiges of state-imposed segregation had
been eliminated, and all vestiges of state-imposed segregation
would not be considered eliminated until the school system had
achieved the "greatest possible degree of actual desegregation, tak-
ing into account the practicalities of the situation." It was not a
right, however, to attend an integrated, let alone a "racially bal-
anced" school, as Professor Graglia implies, since considerations of
practicability might result in the retention of some racially identifi-
able schools within the system.48
Keyes, on the other hand, did not directly involve a question of
remedy-although the holding had significant remedy implica-
tions-but did involve a question of what constituted de jure seg-
regation in a school system located in a state where racial segrega-
tion had not been required by law. Here the Court's approach to
what constitutes de jure segregation-and its adherence to the de
jure-de facto distinction-can be criticized on both doctrinal and
functional grounds. Residential racial segregation and "neighbor-
hood school" assignment had always been the justification for the
massive racial segregation existing in the urban school districts of
the North and West.49 But, as the United States Commission on
Civil Rights pointed out in a study in 1967,5" residential segrega-
tion would not explain the degree and extent of school segregation
existing in those districts. In fact, the school boards were making
discretionary decisions concerning the location of schools, the
closing of old schools and the building of new ones, the redraw-
ing of boundary lines, the assignment of students and faculty, and
the like, in such a way as to maximize actual segregation and main-
tain the racially identifiable character of the schools. Any attempt to
justify these decisions in terms of supposedly neutral criteria would
usually require, in the words of one court, "inconsistent applica-
tions of those criteria. '51 Beginning with cases in the late 1960's,
the lower federal courts almost uniformly held that the school
boards were pursuing policies of segregation that made the result-
ing actual segregation de jure rather than de facto, and required
48 See notes 23-31 and accompanying text supra.
49 As to the extent of such segregation, see U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON EQUAL
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, TOWARD EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess., Table 7-16, reprinted in S. LAW, N. CHACHKIN & N. DORSEN, EMERSON, HABER &
DORSEN'S POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1975 Supp. to vol. 2, at
92-94 (1975).
10 1 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 45, at 60-70.
51 Davis v. School Dist. of Pontiac, 443 F.2d 573, 576 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
913 (1971).
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the dismantling of the dual systems in the same manner as if the
segregation had been required by law. 52
Kees was the first of these cases to reach the Supreme Court.
Although it presented the Court with the substantive question of
what constituted dejure segregation, the question of remedy could
not be fully separated from the nature-and existence-of the sub-
stantive violation under the particular facts of the case. The district
court found that the evidence established that the Denver School
Board was practicing a policy of segregation in the Park Hill dis-
trict, into which blacks had begun to move in the 1950's. The
schools in the "core city," where all the blacks lived prior to the
movement to Park Hill and where the Hispanic population was
concentrated, were virtually all-black and Hispanic. 53 The district
court found that the segregation existing in the "core city" schools
was de facto rather than de jure, and the Tenth Circuit agreed. 4
The Supreme Court limited review to the question of the segre-
gated character of the "core city" schools, and according to Profes-
sor Graglia, the Denver School Board was "subject to a kind of
shell game and found to have lost."55
The Court, with Justices Douglas and Powell disagreeing on
this point, adhered to the de jure-de facto distinction, and held
that where segregation had not been required by state law the
plaintiffs seeking to establish de jure segregation had to show a
policy of segregation, or as the Court put it, "purpose or intent
to segregate. "56 The Court went on to hold, however, that proof
of segregatory intent with respect to a "substantial part" of the
system 57 created apresumption with respect to the system as a whole,
52 See, e.g., United States v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs of Indianapolis, 474 F.2d 81 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973); Kelly v. Guinn, 456 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 413 U.S. 919 (1973); Davis v. School Dist. of Pontiac, 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 913 (1971); United States v. School Dist. 151, 404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 943 (1971); Booker v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, Minneapolis, 351 F.
Supp. 799 (D. Minn. 1972).
5' Professor Graglia critizes the district court's factual findings (pp. 162-78), but I
think he puts too much emphasis on the board's rescission of a voluntary integration plan,
and does not adequately deal with the evidence concerning the discretionary decisions that
were made in the Park Hill area.
5' Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 313 F. Supp. 61 (D. Colo. 1970), aff'd in pertinent part,
445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971). The district court, however, found that the "core city"
schools were educationally "inferior" because of their racial-ethnic identifiability, and or-
dered their desegregation. 313 F. Supp. at 83. The Tenth Circuit overturned this holding,
on the ground that the alleged educational inferiority was constitutionally irrelevant since
the segregation existing in those schools was not dejure. 445 F.2d at 1004-05.
55 p. 161.
26 413 U.S. at 208 (emphasis omitted).
, Close to 40% of the black students in the district were attending school in the Park
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and shifted the burden to the school board to show that the segre-
gated character of the rest of the system was not the result of
"intentionally segregative actions." 58 This presumption could only
be rebutted by a showing that segregatory intent was not among the
factors that motivated the school board's actions. 59 The Court ad-
vanced a twofold justification for this presumption. First, if state-
imposed segregation is found in a substantial portion of the school
system, "it is only common sense to conclude that there exists a
predicate for a finding of the existence of a dual school system,' 16
since parts of a school district are generally not administered in
isolation. Second, if segregatory intent is present in the operation
of part of the system, it is also likely that it is present in the
remainder of the system.61 As Justice Powell pointed out in his
separate opinion, it will be a practical impossibility for a school
board to rebut the presumption of segregatory intent;62 there is no
way that the board can show that segregatory intent was not among
the factors that influenced its decisions. This is what has happened
in practice, both when Keyes was remanded to the district court, 63
and in practically all of the post-Keyes cases involving challenges to
board policies of segregation. 64 Once a court finds that a school
board has been pursuing a policy of segregation, it is required to
dismantle the dual system in the same manner as a school system
located in a state where segregation was once required by law, by
achieving the "greatest possible degree of actual desegregation, tak-
ing into account the practicalities of the situation." Again, no effort
is made to sort out the schools that would have been segregated
"naturally" from those that were segregated because the board was
pursuing a policy of segregation.65
Justices Douglas and Powell, coming from different directions
and reaching ultimately different conclusions, both urged the
Court to abandon the de jure-de facto distinction and to hold that
the maintenance of racially segregated schools was harmful to
black children. Justice Douglas apparently would require the inte-
Hill area. Segregatory intent was also shown by a racially discriminatory pattern of teacher
assignment. 413 U.S. at 199-200.
5 18 Id. at 208.
59Id. at 210-11.6 1 Id. at 201.
61 Id. at 207-09.
62 Id. at 236-37.
63 See Graglia's discussion of the case on remand. Pp. 198-202.
64 See, e.g., United States v. School Dist. of Omaha, 521 F.2d 530 (8th Cir. 1975); cases
cited atid. 535 n.7.
65 See the discussion of this point in the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Keyes on remand.
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 521 F.2d 465, 471-75 (10th Cir. 1975).
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gration of all racially identifiable black schools to the fullest extent
practicable.66 Justice Powell would balance the harm to black chil-
dren from the maintenance of racially segregated schools against
other values, such as attendance at "neighborhood schools," and
would not require the elimination of racially segregated schools if
this could only be achieved by cross-busing. 67
Professor Graglia sharply criticizes Keyes, and I think that his
criticism is warranted.68 He attacks the Court's presumption ra-
tionale as applied to the facts of Keyes, by noting that the "core city"
schools were black before blacks began to move into the Park Hill
section. Thus, there was no way that segregation in the Park Hill
area could have had any effect on the segregation of the "core city"
schools. Additionally, it was not rational to presume that segregat-
ory intent existing in the 1960's, when the actions were taken with
respect to the Park Hill schools, had any application to the actions
taken in the 1950's and earlier with respect to the "core city"
schools. 69 There can be no doubt that the "core city" schools would
have been segregated regardless of "segregatory intent," and there
was no showing that the board tried to maximize the segregation,
given the patterns of residential segregation existing in the "core
city." Moreover, the "remedy dilemma" that the Court faced in
Swann was not present in Keyes. In a state where school segregation
was never required by law, the present structure of the school
system cannot be related to state-imposed segregation. To the ex-
tent that the school system is segregated because of board policy,
the specific consequences of that policy-which schools are segre-
gated as a result of it--can generally be shown. Although in some
cases the consequences will be system-wide,70 Keyes was not such a
case, and it would not have been difficult to sort out the de jure
from the de facto segregation. Clearly, the decision in Keyes is sub-
ject to Professor Graglia's criticism that the Court has not directly
related the extent of required racial integration to the extent of
state-imposed segregation. If "segregatory intent" is the test, then
Professor Graglia can legitimately contend that only the actual seg-
66 Justice Douglas did not expressly discuss the remedy question in his opinion, but he
said nothing to indicate that anything less than "the greatest possible degree of actual de-
segregation, taking into account the practicalities of the situation" would be required. 413
U.S. at 214-17.
6 7 Id. at 237-52.
68 1 say this from an academic rather than a litigative perspective, since Keyes makes it
easy to prove the existence of de jure segregation in most urban school districts.
69 pp. 179-85.
76 This appeared to be the case in United States v. School Dist. of Omaha, 521 F.2d
530 (8th Cir. 1975).
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regation traceable to "segregatory intent" is constitutionally im-
permissible and subject to judicial remedy.7 '
More significantly, perhaps, Keyes points up the questionable
justification for continued adherence to the de jure-de facto dis-
tinction. As Justice Powell emphasized in his separate opinion, the
harm to black children from attendance at segregated schools is the
same regardless of the "source" of the segregation, and their enti-
tlement to relief should not depend on a showing of something as
elusive as "segregatory intent. '7 2 In this regard, Professor Graglia's
criticism of the Court's approach to "race and the schools" is most
telling. While making it clear that he does not see the Constitution
as creating a substantive right on the part of black children to
attend integrated schools, Professor Graglia emphasizes that the
Court has never explicitly come to grips with this question, and as
he puts it, "a requirement of integration must be of nationwide
application and justified, on its own merits, as such. 7 3 Similarly, as
he states in attacking the requirement of "segregatory intent":
The concern of the law, here as elsewhere, is presumably
with the objective consequences of actions, not with mental
states. When an action, such as the use of neighborhood as-
signment in a racially imbalanced neighborhood, has both de-
sired and undesired consequences, a value judgment as to gains
and losses is unavoidably involved. To purport to test the legal-
ity of the action by "intent" is only to make the basis of that
judgment obscure.7 4
It is this value judgment that the Court has not yet made.
Disaster by Decree is a most stimulating and interesting book.
Although I disagree with some of Professor Graglia's conclusions, I
agree with him on many points. I do not think that the Court has,
under the guise of remedying past segregation, imposed a re-
quirement of "racial balance," or more accurately, imposed a re-
quirement of "maximum desegregation," because it has engaged
in "policy-making" and has concluded that racial integration is
"socially desirable." Rather, I think that in the state where segre-
" Pp. 188-93. Professor Graglia's view on this point now seems to be shared by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist. See Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. United
States, 97 S. Ct. 517, 517-19 (1976) (concurring opinion, Burger, C.J., Powell, J., &
Rehnquist, J.), where the Court vacated the lower court judgment and remanded the case
for a reconsideration of "segregatory intent." The concurring Justices would have had the
remand order include a reconsideration of the scope of the remedy in the event that
segregatory intent were found to exist.
72 413 U.S. at 230-35.
P3 . 84.
4 p. 186.
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gation was formerly required by law, the Court has made the
"remedy value judgment" that such segregation can only be ef-
fectively eliminated by requiring the "greatest possible degree
of actual desegregation, taking into account the practicalities of
the situation." Although arguments can be advanced in opposi-
tion to that value judgment, it cannot be attacked without re-
gard to the remedy context in which it was made. Professor
Graglia's criticism of the Court is well-founded in its treatment of
segregation in school districts located in states where segregation
was not required by law. The Court has imposed a substantive test
of "segregatory intent," which ordinarily is not difficult to meet,
but which is subject to the criticism of doctrinal and functional
inconsistency; if the test is "segregatory intent," as Professor Grag-
lia argues, then only the actual segregation that can be traced to
"segregatory intent" is constitutionally impermissible and subject to
judicial remedy. Moreover, the Court has never explained why
actual segregation not resulting from "segregatory intent" is any
less harmful to black children, and it has failed to come to grips
with the underlying question of whether the Constitution requires
the state, to the extent that it is practicable, to provide an inte-
grated education for all black children.
Unlike Professor Graglia, I do not believe that court-ordered
busing is a "disaster." Quite to the contrary, I believe that the
values embodied in the fourteenth amendment, particularly the
value of black freedom, 75 render constitutionally intolerable the
maintenance of racially segregated schools, regardless of whether
they constitute "vestiges of state-imposed segregation," as in Swann,
or "manifestations of segregatory intent," as in Keyes. It is this point
of difference between Professor Graglia and myself that involves
crucial value choices, and as Disaster by Decree demonstrates most
clearly, these value choices remain to be made.
Robert Allen Sedler*
7 5 See Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 387 (1967).
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. Visiting Professor of Law, Cornell Univer-
sity 1976-77. A.B. 1956, J.D. 1959, University of Pittsburgh.
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